Case Study 02

Research question:

Has the Turkish military violated Articles 52 and 54 of the Geneva Conventions by intentionally targeting civilian infrastructure in Serêkaniyê and Tel Abyad, Syria?

On August 7, 2019 the United States and Turkey agreed to establish a ‘safe zone’ in northeast Syria in order to minimize the threat of cross-border attacks by Syrian Kurdish militias. The proposed 30-kilometer safe zone would extend Turkey’s control over key cities in northeast Syria, including Qamishli, Kobane, Tal Abyad, Ras al Ain, Amudeh, Ain Issa and Manbij, as well as nearby oil reserves and their associated trucking routes. It would also offer President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a politically-convenient place to resettle some of the 3.5 million Arab-Syrian refugees currently seeking asylum within Turkey’s borders.

While Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu celebrated the August 7th agreement as a crucial step in transforming “the terror corridor [of Northeast Syria] into a peace corridor,” humanitarian workers warned that a Turkish-led military operation could precipitate a large-scale displacement event and trigger widespread political instability.

Initially, US President Donald Trump committed US troops to the ‘safe zone’ operation, supporting the first US-Turkey joint military patrol along the outskirts of Tel Abyad, Syria on September 8th. But one month later, President Trump did an about-face and unexpectedly announced the complete withdrawal of US military forces from northeast Syria. 

The sudden US withdrawal from key border cities laid the groundwork for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to unilaterally implement his long-planned military operation into northeast Syria. Codenamed “Operation Spring Peace”, the Turkish military offensive began on October 9th, and operations conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Army are ongoing at the time of this report. Since the first TAF airstrikes in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad on October 9th, over 200,000 Kurdish-Syrians have been displaced and over 200 people have been killed.

Exhibit 01 - Why does Erdogan want to expel or displace the Kurds?

Reports of flagrant human rights abuses and breaches of international law have continued to surface. Civilian footage and primary witness accounts suggest that the Turkish military has launched airstrikes on civilian infrastructures in Serêkaniyê, Syria between the dates of October 12 and October 13th, 2019. Reported targets include a water tower, a bakery, electricity grids and a convoy of Kurdish civilians. 

If verified, the Turkish military could be implicated for violating Article 52 of the Geneva Conventions, which condemns attacks on general civilian targets; and Article 54 of the Geneva Conventions, which protects objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian population, including, but not limited to foodstuffs and drinking water installations. 

This project seeks to investigate, document and expose the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure within the towns of Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad in northeast Syria during the first ten days of the Turkish invasion. A multidisciplinary research team will draw on a blend of primary witness accounts, crowd-sourced media and expert testimonials in order to build a dossier of evidence to hold the Turkish military accountable to its commitments under international law.

Exhibit 02 - Syria-based researchers distribute a weekly excel sheet documenting incidents of abuse and unlawful abuse via WhatsApp

Initial research into the targeting of civilian infrastructure in northeast Syria was led by Cate Brown and supported by researchers at the Qamishlo-based Rojava Information Center, as well as several Hasakeh-based humanitarian workers.

The 10-week investigation was broken into three segments:

• Data Collection - Researchers used Yandex to determine the exact geolocation of Allouk water station along the Turkey-Syria border. By creating a geofence within ‘x’ km of the dam, researchers able to pool all Twitter media posted between October 9-13th in the northern Hesakeh region. The drag net was expanded using relevant hashtags or terms in English, Arabic and Kurdish. Researchers compared citizen accounts to local media sources, as well as the daily reports issued by the Rojava Information Center over a WhatsApp broadcast list.

• Video Verification - The team selected Rojava-based citizens, as well as various experts and journalists for a first round of interviews. We used INVID, liveuamap and time / date comparisons to assemble and verify our initial media selections. 

• Assembly and scripting - Hanna and I published our initial findings, as well as the outcomes of Hanna’s weapons research, as two reports on Medium in December 2019. Due to an unexpected family emergency, we were forced to put video production on hold at that time. The project has sat dormant for nine months, as Cate has continued to speak with sources, monitor RIC and ReliefWeb reports, and consider how the onset of COVID-19 might exacerbate northeast Syria’s extreme water shortages. 

Exhibit 03 - An overview of research techniques used to source, verify and assemble visual documentation in support of our primary research query

Outcomes

1. Early research findings published on Medium, including clips from the initial protests against the US withdrawal. My research partner and I have continued to examine new questions about the role that US weapons have played in the Turkish invasion of northeast Syria.

2. Shared underreported footage of chemical weapons attacks with my former colleagues at Human Rights Watch to support ongoing documentation.

3. In October 2020, I pitched this story to Business Insider TV after viewing a short piece on the arrival of Iraqi and Kurdish refugees in Turkey. The pitch was accepted and I am currently co-producing a 12-minute video documenting the impacts of Turkey’s repeated attacks on Syria’s water infrastructure in Hesakeh province.

   Live interviews with families in Tel Temir, Al Hol refugee camp and Hesakeh city supplement open-source documentation collected over the past year. Since my research started in 2019, officials with the Hasakeh Water Establishment have documented more than 16 attacks on local water infrastructure, barring over half a million people from having consistent and reliable access to potable water.

4. Delayed several months due to the pandemic and editor assignments, our final piece about Turkey’s unlawful targeting of civilian infrastructure was published in May 2021, “Why Turkey Is Being Accused Of Using Water As A Weapon In Syria”.

Acknowledgements

This year-long monitoring and documentation project would not have been possible without the support of incredibly capable and committed colleagues. Hanna Homestead (SIPA, ‘20) assisted with desk research, weapons identification, scripting and all New York-based interviews. Former Human Rights Watch Deputy Executive Director of Programs Iain Levine provided guidance on evidence-collection and human rights reporting standards. Professor Erica Berenstein (BITV, New York Times) has offered continual support with video collection and OSINT verification methodologies; and data journalist Alex Gonçalves PhD has graciously fielded all of my questions about JSON codes and Twitter monitoring.